Humanitarian Bombing vs. Iraqi Freedom
Analysis, June 2003
This June marks the 4th
year anniversary of NATOs presence in the Serbian province of Kosovo. Given that the Kosovo Mission may be perceived by some as a success
story, offering precedence in the approach of the international communitys strategy for dealing with post-war Iraq, it would
be both timely and wise to, recap the "successes" of NATOs Mission in Kosovo. Such a reflection may prove to be a telling
and honest warning to those embarking on similar, future projects in Iraq.
"Maintain civil law and order; promote
human rights; and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo" - UNMIK
Mandate
Almost four years after the United Nations established its mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), inter-ethnic
hostility is still widespread and the few Serbs remaining in the province, are afraid to travel freely.
Although the number
of ethnically motivated attacks can be interpreted in many different ways, tensions between the ethnic Albanian majority and the Serbian minority remain high. Surrounded and outnumbered
by the ethnic Albanian majority (many of whom see no room for Serbs in Kosovo) the Serbs are realistically pessimistic about
their future.
The ethnic make up of the population of Pristina reflects the validity of this fear. Since 1999, the
population of Pristina has grown to over 500,000 people less than 200 of which are Serbs.
Since the NATOs entry into
Kosovo in June of 1999, the indigent population of this region has suffered at the hands of Albanian extremists and organized terrorists. The NATO troops, operating under the
organization of KFOR (Kosovo Force), have done little to protect minority groups and have stood by and watched as over 350,000 people were ethnically cleansed from the region (primarily the Serbs and Roma) and over 2,500 Serbs were abducted or killed.More than 200,000 Kosovo Serbs have left their homes as a result of extremist
violence or fearing bloody reprisals from Albanians. The 80,000 to 120,000 Serbs who remain live in isolated enclaves, sometimes as small as a single apartment
block, "protected" by NATO troops.
The continual depletion of the number of NATO soldiers committed to Kosovo is a strong indication that little will be done to help these
victims or prevent the further persecution of minorities in Kosovo.
As a result of this absence of multi-ethnic tolerance,
the non-Albanian population of Kosovo is forced to live in ethnic ghettos. For those living in ghettos, it is not safe to
travel freely. Consequently, they can only travel if KFOR provides an armed escort. The people are left to the mercy of the
schedules and goodwill of the KFOR unit assigned to this escort task. Should the particular KFOR unit "not feel like" providing
this service, trips to the hospital, the market, school, church or polling booths are not possible.
While Kosovos
Serbian National Council has demanded that the UN Security Council and NATO urgently develop a plan for the protection of the Serbian communities within the province,
the reality is that the KFOR check-points, guaranteeing some level of security to the remaining Serbian enclaves, have all
but disappeared.
The decision to remove the checkpoints was ordered by the UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo)
administrator Michael Steiner, who believed that the security situation had improved significantly.
Mr. Steiners position
was contradicted by the provinces UN Ombudsman, Marek Anton Novicki, who stated that: "The situation is not in the least bit optimistic for the Serbs who have been expelled to return
to urban regions, and at the moment there are no basic conditions for their return."
At the same time, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) claim that Kosovos minorities
lack access to education, healthcare services and equitable employment.
The report issued by these organizations states
that one concern is primarily the minority Serb and Roma populations, which find it harder to move around freely and therefore
to live normal lives in Kosovo where ethnic Albanians are an overwhelming majority.
The question is then, on the foundation
of what information does the UN Administrator base his position? The inconsistency in the two positions indicates an inherent
lack of communication between the two UN agencies, the UNMIK and the UNHCR.
As a warning to the unfounded and bias
position of the UNMIK, the incident rate of murder, terrorist activities and hate crimes in the region is, despite the presence
of the international community, increasing.
NATO created the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a local constabulary allegedly comprised of terrorists from the supposedly disbanded Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). From the time
of its establishment, this organization has presented only roadblocks in the path of those trying to establish stability in
the region. The KPC is openly engaged in organized crime. They run the regions largest drug trafficking operations and fund themselves through protection rackets across Kosovo - shopkeepers, businessmen
and contractors across the province (including Pristina, Suva Reka, Dragash, Istok and Prizren) are required to pay the KPC
"protection". Instead of focusing on building and establishing the civic foundations for the future of Kosovo, the international
community has been forced to commit its time and resources to investigating and persecuting the criminal and terrorist cells
that exist within the KPC, and that operate not only within the province of Kosovo but have infiltrated Macedonia and other regions within Serbia as well.
Macedonia remains volatile after a 2001 conflict
between ethnic Albanian insurgents and Macedonian government troops. A renegade ethnic Albanian group, known as the "Albanian National Army", who operates from Kosovo, plans, organizes and executes occasional terrorist attacks in Macedonia.
This group advocates the unification of ethnic Albanian-dominated areas in several Balkan countries.
It is clear that
the UNMIK Mission in Kosovo has turned a blind eye to the corruption that has infiltrated this operation. It is impossible
to imagine that the KPC, and those groups similar to them, can operate their international-scale drug rings (to the extent that they have been tagged as the
"heroin bridge" linking the orient and Europe), without the intentional ignorance of the UNMIK. The watchful leaders
of the UNMIK appeared to have disregarded organized crime in Kosovo, and are seemingly unmotivated to take any action in combating
the drug trafficking, prostitution rings, organized crime and threat of potential terrorism that exists in the province. Even the Albanian population in Kosovo has come to see that the UNMIK is clearly incapable of instituting positive and proactive change
in the province.
Multi-ethnic tolerance in Kosovo has not been established. The murder and persecution of ethnic minorities in the province not only continue to happen, but
these incidents are not even reported by the provinces media outlets, which are of course, owned and operated by the Albanians. Moreover,
anything and everything that bears any resemblance to a culture other than Albanian, is destroyed.
This politically
corrupt and culturally intolerant climate continues to strengthen its hold on the province. And in spite of the efforts of
renowned international human rights agencies (such as Amnesty International), who have voiced their concerns over Kosovos oppressed minorities, nothing has been done to instigate change. Amnesty International
has conclusively stated that: "Unless such rights can be guaranteed, minority refugees and internally displaced people in
other parts of Serbia and Montenegro will be unable to return to their homes."
When assessing the shortcomings of
progress in Kosovo, the ineffectiveness of the Government in Belgrade to take a proactive role cannot go unmentioned. As the
primary stakeholder, Belgrade has failed to propose a constructive or detailed plan for their vision of the future of Kosovo.
More importantly, the Serbian Government has been unable to create enough presence in order to hold the international force
responsible and accountable in governing this province according to resolution 1244 and as an integral part of their sovereign
state.
READ MORE: http://www.balkanpeace.org/our/our14.shtml
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Robert Fisk and others on Wesley Clark & Iraq: What is Happening
Is An Absolute Slaughter Every Night of Iraqi People
Democracy Now!, September 18, 2003
ROBERT FISK: I have to say first of all about General Clark, that I was on the ground in Serbia in Kosovo
when he ran the war there. He didn't seem to be very antiwar at the time. I had as one of my tasks to go out over and over
again to look at the civilian casualties of that have war. At one point NATO bombed the hospital in which Yugoslav soldiers,
against the rules of war, were hiding along with the patients and almost all the patients were killed. This was the war, remember,
where the first attack was made on a radio station, the Serb Radio and Television building. Since then we've had attacks twice
on the Al Jazeera television station. First of all in Afghanistan in 2001, then killing their chief correspondent, and again
in Baghdad, this year. This was a general who I remember bombed series of bridges, in one of which an aircraft bombed the
train and after, he'd seen the train and had come to a stop, the pilot bombed the bridge again. I saw one occasion when a
plane came in, bombed a bridge over a river in Serbia proper, as we like to call it, and after about 12 minutes when rescuers
arrived, a bridge too narrow even for tanks, bombed the rescuers. I remember General Clark telling us that more than 100 Yugoslav
tanks had been destroyed in the weeks of that war. And when the war came to an end, we discovered number of Yugoslav tanks
destroyed were 11. 100 indeed. So this was not a man, frankly whom, if I were an American, would vote for, but not being an
American, I don't have to. . . . (read more)
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How the battle lies were drawn The Spectator - June 14,
2003
By: Neil Clark
The WMDs haven't turned up. In 1999 there was
no genocide in Kosovo. But, says Neil Clark, Tony Blair has never allowed the facts to get in the way of a good war
If
you ever get to Belgrade Zoo, don't miss the snake house. There, in nicely heated tanks, you will see two rather fearsome-looking
pythons, one named Warren and the other Madeleine. The names of Bill Clinton's secretaries of state - Warren Christopher and
Madeleine Albright - will not be forgotten quickly in the capital of the former Yugoslavia. Seeing the two pythons slithering
in their tanks reminded me of the murderous foreign policy of the Clinton administration and the enthusiastic support it received
from New Labour.
For amid the present furore over the noshow of Iraqi WMDs, let us remember that in Kosovo our humanitarian
Prime Minister dragged this country into an illegal, USsponsored war on grounds which later proved to be fraudulent. In 2003
Tony's Big Whopper was that Saddam's WMDs 'could be activated within 45 minutes'. In 1999 it was that Slobodan Milosevic's
Yugoslavia was 'set on a Hitler-style genocide equivalent to the extermination of the Jews during World War Two'. Clare Short
now complains that the Prime Minister 'duped' the public over the non-existent Iraqi threat. But four years ago, Short and
her fellow Cabinet resigner Robin Cook were enthusiastic collaborators in Blair's equally squalid campaign to 'dupe' the British
public over Kosovo.
Cook's role in the war on Yugoslavia was described by the late Auberon Waugh as a 'national disgrace'.
A closer examination of the part played by the former foreign secretary in the military conflict makes you wonder why he too
did not end up commemorated in a Belgrade snake house.
Consider his role in the farcical 'peace negotiations' at Rambouillet
- the successful conclusion of which Washington and London desired as much as they wanted Hans Blix's weapons inspectors to
be able to complete their mission in Iraq.
Cook claimed that 'the reason they the Serbs refused to agree to the peace
process was that they were not willing to agree to the autonomy of Kosovo, or for that autonomy to be guaranteed by an international
military presence at all'. In fact, the Yugoslavs had by February 1999 already agreed to most of the autonomy proposals and
had assented to a UN (but not Nato) peacekeeping team entering Kosovo.
It was the unwelcome prospect of Milosevic
signing up to a peace deal and thereby depriving the US of its casus belli that caused Secretary of State Albright, with the
connivance of Cook, to insert new terms into the Rambouillet accord purposely designed to be rejected by Belgrade. Appendix
B to chapter seven of the document provided not only for the Nato occupation of Kosovo, but also for 'unrestricted access'
for Nato aircraft, tanks and troops throughout Yugoslavia.
The full text of the Rambouillet document was kept secret
from the public and came to light only when published in Le Monde Diplomatique on 17 April. By this time, the war was almost
a month old and the casting of Milosevic as the 'aggressor' had already successfully been achieved.
The Kosovan war
was, we were repeatedly told, fought 'to stop a humanitarian catastrophe'. 'It is no exaggeration to say that what is happening
is racial genocide' - claimed the British Prime Minister - 'something we had hoped we would never again experience in Europe.
Thousands have been murdered, 100,000 men are missing and hundreds forced to flee their homes and the country.' The Serbs
were, according to the US State Department, 'conducting a campaign of forced population movement not seen in Europe since
WW2'. One US Information Agency 'fact' sheet claimed that the number of Albanians massacred could be as high as 400,000. Undeterred
by the complete lack of evidence to back up the claims of Washington and London, political pundits, from Lady Thatcher to
Ken Livingstone, weighed in with op-ed pieces comparing Slobodan Milosevic to Adolf Hitler.
But despite its overwhelming
military superiority, Nato's assault on Yugoslavia did not go according to plan. The second week of April was a particularly
bad news week for the humanitarian interventionists. On 12 April Nato bombers hit a passenger train in southern Serbia, killing
10 civilians and injuring 16 others. It was also revealed that the alliance was, despite earlier denials, using depleted uranium.
And, worst of all for the hawks in the US and Britain, EU leaders were due to meet to discuss a German peace plan which would
involve a 24-hour suspension of bombing and UN peacekeepers entering Kosovo.
With public support for war faltering,
and a Downing Street spokesman talking of a 'public-relations meltdown', it was time for the Lie Machine to go into overdrive.
Dr Johnson believed patriotism to be the last refuge of the scoundrel. He clearly hadn't considered the invention of enemy
rape camps. On 13 April an ashenfaced Robin Cook told journalists of 'fresh evidence' that 'young women are being separated
from the refugee columns and forced to undergo systematic rape in an army camp at Djakovica near the Albanian border'. In
fact, Cook's 'evidence' (which was founded solely on uncorroborated claims by Albanian refugees) was not 'fresh' at all, but
had first been presented by US defense spokesman Kenneth Bacon at a press conference the week before. Not to be outdone by
her Cabinet colleague, Clare Short also joined in enthusiastically to add breaches of women's rights to the long litany of
Serb sins. 'The actual rape reports are still in the hundreds, ' claimed the International Development Secretary, 'but they're
deliberate and organised and designed to humiliate, often in front of fathers and husbands and children, you know, just to
give anguish and humiliation to the whole family.' For the record, the UNHCR found no evidence of a rape camp at Djakovica
and even Human Rights Watch, the George Soros-financed NGO hardly known for its pro-Yugoslav stance, announced that it was
'concerned that Nato's use of rape camps to bolster support for the war relied on unconfirmed accounts'. The hysteria over
Serb rape camps rallied support for the war, even though the next day an attack by a Nato plane on a convoy of Albanians killed
64 and wounded 20.
Apologists for the government now claim that we should not jump to hasty conclusions over the failure
of coalition forces to find any Iraqi WMD. But as far as Kosovo is concerned, we have already had plenty of time to discover
the truth.
When John Laughland, writing in The Spectator in November 1999, claimed that the mass graves in Kosovo
were a 'myth', he was loudly denounced by Francis Wheen, Noel Malcolm and a whole host of Nato apologists and lap-top bombardiers.
Four years on, it is Wheen and the supporters of intervention in Kosovo who have the explaining to do. At the Trepca
mine, where Nato told us that up to 700 bodies had been dumped in acid and whose name the Daily Mirror predicted would 'live
alongside those of Belsen, Auschwitz and Treblinka', UN investigators found absolutely nothing, a pattern repeated at one
Nato mass-grave site after another. To date, the total body count of civilians killed in Kosovo in the period 1997-99 is still
fewer than 3,000, a figure that includes not only those killed in open fighting and during Nato air strikes, but also an unidentified
number of Serbs.
Clearly it was an exaggeration - of Munchausenian proportions - for the Prime Minister to describe
what happened in Kosovo as 'racial genocide'.
In both Kosovo and Iraq, the government's war strategy seems to have
been threefold: 1. In order to whip up public support for war, tell lies so outrageous that most people will believe that
no one would have dared to make them up. 2. When the conflict is over, dismiss questions about the continued lack of evidence
as 'irrelevant' and stress alternative 'benefits' from the military action, e. g. , 'liberation' of the people. 3. Much later
on, when the truth is finally revealed, rely on the fact that most people have lost interest and are now concentrating on
the threat posed by the next new Hitler. An admission of the government's culpability for the Kosovan war only slipped out
in July 2000, when Lord Gilbert, the ex-defence minister, told the House of Commons that the Rambouillet terms offered to
the Yugoslav delegation had been 'absolutely intolerable' and expressly designed to provoke war.
Gilbert's bombshell
warranted scarcely a line in the mainstream British media, which had been so keen to label the Yugoslavs the guilty party
a year before.
Last week, to the party's eternal shame, only 11 Labour MPs voted for an independent judicial investigation
into the way the British Prime Minister led us into war against Iraq. But, important as such an inquiry would be, it will
not be enough.
What is also needed is a similar, concurrent investigation into how the Blair government also deceived
the nation over Kosovo. New Labour, of course, would rather we all forgot about non-existent mass graves, mythical rape camps
and phantom WMDs. The interests of democracy and accountable government - to say nothing of those killed in two shameful conflicts
- mean that we must never do so.
PLEASE VISIT THIS WONDERFUL WEBSITE AND LEARN MORE:
OVERVIEW - KLA Islamic Links The Times, US Alarmed as Mujahidins Join Kosovo Rebels, Nov 26, 1998 The Scotsman, US Tackles Islamic Militancy in Kosovo, Nov 30, 1998 AP, Bin Laden Operated Terrorist Network Based in Albania, Nov 29, 1998 Jerusalem Post, Kosovo Seen as New Islamic Bastion, Sep 14, 1998 Sunday Times, Bin Laden Opens a New Terrorist Base in Albania, Nov 29, 1998 Sunday Times, Iranians Move in (Kosovo Link), Mar 22, 1998
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